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ABSTRACT
This research aims to examine the effect of corporate governance on 
company value of LQ 45 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX). The corporate governance mechanism consists of institutional 
ownership, proportion of independent commissioner, managerial 
ownership, independent audit committee, remuneration and nomination 
		
	
	
		
is proxied by Tobin’s Q. This research used 106 companies as a sample 
taken from a population of 135 companies in LQ 45 listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) period 2015-2017. The data were analyzed using a 
multiple linier regression analysis with SPSS program. The result shows 
that corporate governance mechanisms which are proxied by institutional 
ownership, proportion of independent commissioners, board of directors, 
					
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governance which are proxied by managerial ownership, independent audit 
committee, and remuneration and nomination committee have no effect on 
	
ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh tata kelola perusahaan 
terhadap nilai perusahaan pada  perusahaan LQ 45 yang terdaftar 
di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI). Mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan 
terdiri dari kepemilikan institusional, proporsi komisaris independen, 
kepemilikan manajerial, komite audit independen, komite remunerasi 
dan nominasi, dewan direksi, dan dewan komisaris, sedangkan nilai 
perusahaan diproksikan oleh Tobin’s Q. Penelitian ini menggunakan 106 
perusahaan sebagai sampel yang diambil dari populasi yang berjumlah 
135 perusahaan pada LQ 45 yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) 
periode 2015-2017. Data kemudian dianalisis menggunakan regresi linier 
berganda dengan program SPSS. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa 
mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan yang diproksi dengan kepemilikan 
institusional, proporsi komisaris independen, dewan direksi, dan dewan 
komisaris berpengaruh terhadap nilai perusahaan, sedangkan tata kelola 
perusahaan yang diproksikan dengan kepemilikan manajerial, komite audit 
independen, dan komite remunerasi dan nominasi tidak berpengaruh pada 
nilai perusahaan.
1. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of business today is 
encouraging new companies in various sectors 
to enter and compete in market share. On one 
hand, companies in some sectors continue to 
grow each year. On the other hand, several 
companies in other sectors have decreased their 
market share. Competition between companies 
is predicted to be still higher and this will 
make the companies or business people able to 
implement and develop corporate governance 
system properly in order to win the competition. 
If good a corporate governance is carried out 
properly, the company will be able to attract 
investors to invest.
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The issue of corporate governance in 
Indonesia began in 1998, and the most recent 
issue of corporate governance that has become 
a public concern occurred in PT Jasa Marga 
Tbk (JSMR). According to the news published 
in http://www.koran-jakarta.com in 2017, 
investors questioned the quality of GCG 
implemented by PT Jasa Marga Tbk (JSMR), 
because this state-owned company had let one 
of its managers provide gratuity. This is in the 
form of big motorbike “Harley-Davidson” to 
the auditor of the Supreme Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia (BPK).
The trade on 9/26 showed that JSMR’s 
share price fell by 100 points or 1.71 percent to 
IDR 5,750. PT Jasa Marga’s shares were in the 
range of IDR 5,600-5,825 with a trading volume 
of 12.7 million. JSMR shares had fallen to the 
  	
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the level of IDR 5,750 per share. According 
to Binaartha Sekuritas analyst Muhammad 
Nafan Aji Gusta Utama, the existence of bribes 
by JSMR automatically became a negative 
sentiment for market participants. This 
indicates the bad ethics of the company itself. 
This problem made the company value of 
JSMR decrease.
Monica (2018) sated, corporate governance 
allows the presence of supervision and control 
so that management always prioritize the 
shareholders’ interest in making decision. 
However, in corporate governance, there 
       
in interest between managers, as the agent, 
and shareholders or owners, as the principal. 
!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 
(agent) may not act complied with the wishes 
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the corporate governance aims to create 
and provide added value to all stakeholders 
sustainably over a long period by increasing 
the management performance.
As Monica (2018) stated, company value 
is the price that investors are willing to pay for 
each of the company’s share. For that reason, 
that company value in this context is the 
investors’ perception of the company which is 
always associated with the share price.
To increase company value and achieve 
good corporate governance, companies 
need parties or groups who can oversee the 
implementation of directors’ policies such 
as institutional ownership, independent 
commissioners, managerial ownership, audit 
committees, remuneration and nomination 
committees, board of directors, and board 
of commissioners. It is important to see the 
proportions of the institutional ownership, 
board of commissioners, independent owner-
ship, managerial ownership, audit committee, 
remuneration and nomination committee, 
board of directors, and board of commissioners. 
This is because they can be used to determine 
 #  
affects the company value.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the 
company is well controlled by the institution. 
Institutional ownership can also overcome 

and shareholders. The existence of institutional 
investors is considered capable of being an 
effective monitoring mechanism in every 
decision taken by the managers. The result of 
research conducted by Putu (2018), Mateus 
(2017), and Sandra, et al (2015) showed that 
institutional ownership has no effect on 
company value while the result of research 
conducted by Pina (2017) and Adhitya (2016) 
showed that institutional ownership has an 
effect on company value. The inconsistency 
of the results of previous studies prompted 
researchers to conduct this study 
The role of the independent board of 
commissioners is to supervise the company’s 
performance. In the company’s internal 
controls, an effective board of commissioners 
can improve management performance 
standards so that it can increase the company 
% &   ' "+3;$ 
Monica (2018) showed that independent 

company value while the result of research 
conducted by Mateus (2017) showed that 
independent commissioners have no effect on 
company value.
The company shares ownership by 
management or managers will always try to 
protect the investors’ right. The managerial 
ownership will always bear all the losses if 
the company commits fraud, and this will 
encourage managers to increase the company 
value. The result of research conducted by I 
Gusti Ayu, et al (2017) showed that managerial 
ownership has an effect on company value 
while the result of research conducted by 
Mateus (2017) showed that managerial 
ownership has no effect on company value.
Independent audit committee has an 
important role to create a good governance 
in the company. The tasks of the independent 
audit committee are to provide independent 
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professional input to the board of commissioners 
on reports or matters submitted by the 
directors, and to review matters requiring the 
commissioners’ attention. A research by Putu 
(2018) showed that an independent audit 
committee affects company value while that 
by Adhitya (2016) found that the independent 
audit committee does not affect company 
value.
The existence of the remuneration and 
nomination Committee can create more optimal 
management and supervision because those 
who carry out management and supervision 
have been selected according to predetermined 
criteria. Therefore, the existence of this 
committee will increase the company value 
(Christian and Made, 2015). With the existence 
of remuneration and nomination committee, 
the principle of independence, fairness and 
transparency can be carried out so well that 
it can motivate the management to increase 
the company value. Research conducted 
by Christian and Made, 2015 showed that 
remuneration and nomination committee has 
an effect on company value while the research 
conducted by Bambang and Deri (2013) 
showed that the remuneration and nomination 
committee has no effect on company value.
Financial Services Authority Regulation 
Number 33/ Pojk.04/ 2014, concerning 
Directors and Board of Commissioners of 
Issuers or Public Companies, states that board 
of directors is the organ of the Issuer or Public 
Company that has the authority and is fully 
responsible for the management of the Issuer 
=>#
or Public Company, in accordance with the 
aims and objectives of the Issuer or Public 
Company and represents the Issuer or Public 
Company, both inside and outside the court 
complied with the provisions of the articles of 
association.
The board of directors is expected to be 
able to provide information to the board of 
commissioners and answer matters raised 
by the board of commissioners. Studies by 
Adhitya (2016) and Bambang and Deri (2013) 
in several different subsectors showed that the 
board of directors has an effect on company 
value. These studies support this research, 
using the board of directors as a variable. Even 
though the researcher has determined the 
result that the board of directors has an effect 
on company value, the sub-sector under study 
has different result. 
The board of commissioners is the organ of 
the Issuer or Public Company whose duties are 
#?#
accordance with the articles of association and 
to provide advice to the Directors. The board of 
commissioner, as management controller, can 
effectively improve management performance 
standard, by increasing company value. A 
study by Yusuf et al, (2017) showed that the 
board of commissioner affects company value 
while that by Sandra, et al (2015) shows that 
the board of commissioners has no effect on it.
The researcher measures the company 
value by using Tobin’s Q ratio. The ratio can 
be calculated using the market value of equity 
plus the book value of debt and then divided by 
the total book value of total assets. The market 
value of equity is the value of equity based on 
market price that is always associated with 
share price. Tobin’s Q ratio is more accurate 
because it not only provides a fundamental 
picture but also measures the management’s 
effectiveness.
The higher the value of Tobin’s Q, 
the higher the investor will invest in the 
company. This research was conducted at LQ 
45 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Based on the background of the 
problems above, this study examines the effect 
of corporate governance on company value 
(an empirical study of LQ 45 companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2015-
2017).
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS

Agency theory explains the function 
separation between shareholders and company 
management. Agency theory, according to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), is a contract 
under one or more persons (the principals) 
that engage another person (agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent. According to Hamdani, (2016: 30), 
agency relationship is a contract between the 
manager (agent) and the investor (principal). 
>      
agent occur because there is a possibility that 
the agent does not always act in accordance 
with principal interests, thereby triggering 
agency costs.
In this case, agency theory is closely 
related to company value because agency 
relationship is a contract where one or more 
people (principal) governs another person 
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(agent) to perform a service on behalf of the 
principal and authorizes the agent to make the 
best decision for the interest of the principal. If 
both parties have the same goal to maximize 
the company value, the agent will surely act in 
accordance with the principal’s interest.

Firm value is the investor’s perception of the 
company which is often associated with share 
price (Bambang, 2013). The higher the share 
price, the higher the company value. High 
company value is desired by the owners of the 
company because the high value also shows 
the shareholders’ high prosperity. The wealth 
of shareholders and companies is represented 
   #     
    
management (Hamdani, 2016: 138).
According to Monica (2017), the company 
      #% !
company value will increase if the price of the 
company’s shares increases. This is of course 
    ##%
These investment opportunities will provide a 
positive signal for the company’s growth in the 
future.
!
Corporate governance is the institutional 
arrangement and relationship that direct 
and control the company (Hamdani, 2016: 
22). Corporate governance also includes the 
relationship between the stakeholders as well 
as the company management’s objective. The 
main parties in corporate governance are 
shareholders, management, and the board 
of directors while other stakeholders include 
employees, suppliers, bank customers, and 
other creditors, regulators, environment, and 
community. According to Hamdani (2016: 22), 
the implementation of corporate governance 
encourages the creation of healthy competition 
and a conducive business climate. Therefore, 
the implementation of Good Corporate 
Governance (GCG) by companies in Indonesia 
is very important to support sustainable 
economic growth and stability.
"	
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Institutional ownership is usually in the form 
of a pension fund and insurance that aims to 
maximize their investment in companies that 
implement GCG. Institutional investors often 
become the majority in share ownership. 
The greater the institutional ownership, the 
greater the encouragement and motivation of 
management to optimize the company value.
"
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The National Committee for Good Corporate 
Governance (KNGCG) issued guidelines 
on independent commissioners in public 
companies. An independent commissioner is 
the member of the Board of Commissioners 
who has no relationship with the Board of 
Directors, other members of the board of 
commissioners, and majority stakeholders. 
In addition, the independent commissioner 
must also be free from business relationship 
and other relationships that can affect his 
capacity to be able to perform his duties as an 
independent commissioner who purely works 
in the company’s interest. The higher the 
proportion of independent commissioners, the 
tighter the monitoring activities carried out. 
The smaller the agency costs from monitoring 
     #
which will ultimately increase the company 
value.
$
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Managerial ownership is the number of shares 
owned by the company management that 
actively participates in decision making in a 
company (Effendi, 2016: 59). The existence of 
managerial ownership obviously can align 
the potential differences in interests between 
outside shareholders and management (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) in (Mateus, 2017). The 
company that is led by a manager who also 
serves as a shareholder is better because the 
manager ic more careful in taking actions that 
might have a bad impact on the company and 
on him as a shareholder.
"
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The decree of the board of directors of PT. 
Jakarta Stock Exchange No Kep 315 / BEJ / 06-
2000 point 2f, regarding the establishment of 
an audit committee, states that an independent 
audit committee is a committee formed by the 
board of commissioners of listed companies 
whose members are appointed and dismissed by 
the board of commissioners of listed companies 
to help the board of commissioners of listed 
companies conduct audits or research which 
is deemed necessary for the implementation of 
the directors’ functions in the management of 
listed companies. According to Mateus (2017), 
the duties of audit committee are to provide 
opinions to the Board of Commissioners on 
reports or matters submitted by the Directors 
to the Board of Commissioners, to conduct a 
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supervise the company’s internal control.
The independent audit committee, 
according to Effendi (2009: 30), consists of 
an independent commissioner who also 
serves as a chairman. The independent audit 
committee comes from an independent 
#   X#    
   %   
independent audit committee can also assess 
the effectiveness of internal control so that it 
can provide recommendation for increasing 
the effectiveness of internal auditors, thus, to 
improve the internal control system.
%
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The task of the Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee is to make recommendation 
on the decision regarding remuneration/ 
compensation for the Board of Directors and 
other compensation policies, including the 
relationship between company performance 
and compensation for company executives, 
in this case the CEO (Bambang and Deri, 
2013). The remuneration and nomination 
committee in a company may not have an 
#=
Company, members of the Board of Directors, 
members of the Board of Commissioners, or 
the Major Shareholders of the Issuer or Public 
Company so that nothing unexpected happens 
to the company.
'()
	
According to Hamdani (2016: 86), directors 
are corporate organs given responsibility with 
managing the company. One of the roles of 
the directors is to control the management of 
company resources and funds from investors. 
The board of directors in a company determines 
the company’s policies or the company’s short-
term and long-term strategy.
Members of the board of directors 
are not permitted to use the company for 
personal, family, business group and other 
parties’ interests. The members of the board 
of directors must understand and implement 
GCG guidelines. The company’s management 
      
tasks: management, risk management, 
internal control, communication, and social 
responsibility.
'(
		
	
The Board of Commissioners, as a corporate 
organ, has a collective duty and responsibility 
to supervise and provide advice to directors and 
to ensure that the company implements GCG 
(Hamdani, 2016: 82). As an internal organizer, 
an effective board of commissioners can 
improve management performance standards 
in the company so that it increase the company 
value. In order to carry out their function, 
the members of the board of commissioners 
both jointly or individually are entitled to 
have access to and obtain information about 
the company completely and on time. There 
are three important elements that affect the 
effectiveness of the board of commissioners, 
namely independence, competence, and 
commitment.
 (( ( "	
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According to Putu (2018), institutional 
ownership is ownership by external institutions. 
The greater the ownership of the institution, the 
greater the power and encouragement of the 
institution to oversee management. As a result, 
it will provide greater impetus to optimize 
the value of the company so that company 
performance will increase. This statement is 
in line with the results of research conducted 
by Monica (2018) and Pina Anggi (2017) that 
 #     
value.
Hypothesis 1: Institutional ownership has an effect 
	
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 ( 
		
	  

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'"+3;$
that independent commissioners have an effect 
on company value. The independent board of 
commissioners determines the level of success 
in achieving goals and improving company 
performance. The higher the proportion 
of independent commissioners, the more 
stringent the monitoring activities carried out. 
By doing this, the company’s agency costs will 
 
ultimately can increase the company value.
Hypothesis 2: Independent Commissioners have 
			
((($
#	
-

Managerial ownership affects the company 
value because the shares owned by the 
manager can motivate the managers to 
improve their performance and this can affect 
the company value. The higher the proportion 
160
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of managerial ownership in a company, the 
better the company will be. The manager will 
always be careful in bearing all actions that will 
affect both himself and the company.
Hypothesis 3: Managerial ownership has an effect 
	
((("
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The duty of independent audit committee 
appointed by the Board of Commissioners 
is to oversee the company operation, 
   "' +3;$% Z
of the functions of the audit committee is 
to bridge between the shareholders and the 
board of commissioners with control activities 
carried out by management, internal auditors 
and external auditors. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that with the existence of an audit 
committee, the company is expected to run 
#
value can increase. This argument is in line 
with the result of previous research conducted 
by Ridho et al (2017) in which, the independent 
%
Hypothesis 4: Independent Audit Committee has 
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	
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Research conducted by Christian and I 
Made (2015) showed that the remuneration 
and nomination committee has an effect 
on the company value. Furthermore, the 
remuneration and nomination committee must 
be chaired by an independent commissioner so 
that the nomination mechanism is not under 
 #     #% !
greater the members of the nomination and 
remuneration committee chosen according to 
the criteria, the more optimal the management 
and supervision. As such, the existence of 
this committee can increase the value of the 
company.
Hypothesis 5: Remuneration and nomination 
					
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(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The board of directors is an important 
element in the company because the directors 
are responsible for managing the company 
    #   
sustainability of the company’s business. 
According to Adhitya (2016), the board of 
directors has an effect on the company value. 
The more members of the board of directors 
in charge of carrying out company operations 
and management in achieving company goals, 
the better the performance of the company, 
thus increasing company value.
Hypothesis 6: The board of directors has an effect 
	
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The board of commissioners as a corporate 
organ has a collective duty and responsibility 
to carry out supervision, to provide advice to 
the directors, and to ensure that the company 
implements corporate governance. Members 
of the board of commissioners must be 
professional. They must have integrity and 
ability to carry out their functions properly, 
including ensuring that they take into account 
all the interests of other position holders. 
The greater the members of the board of 
commissioners who are thorough and detailed 
in carrying out their duties in increasing the 
company value, the less likely the board of 
directors to use the board of commissioners for 
%
Hypothesis 7: The board of commissioners has an 
			
The conceptual framework underlying 
this research is presented on Figure 1. 
3.  RESEARCH METHOD
*		


The population in this study was LQ 45 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2015-2017. This study used a 
#[
reports of LQ 45 companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. The researcher 
took the sample by using a saturated sampling 
technique. Saturated sampling technique is a 
sampling technique that considers all members 
of the population as a sample. Researchers used 
LQ 45 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during the study period 2015-2017.
&	)
This study took a sample of LQ 45 companies 
listed on the Stock Exchange during the period 
2015-2017. The data collection was indirect 
method because the data were in the form of 
document that could be downloaded at www.
idx.co.id and included secondary data types.
&	
+
The study used research variables such as 
company value, as the dependent variable, 
and corporate governance, as the independent 
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variable, which is proxied by institutional 
ownership, independent commissioner, 
managerial ownership, independent audit 
committee, remuneration and nomination 
committee, board of directors, and board of 
commissioners.
,+
/	04
Company value is the company’s performance, 
measured using the following formula:
Tobin’s Q = MVE + DEBT
      TA
Note:
Tobin’s Q  = Firm Value
MVE  = Market Value of equity (closing 
price of shares x number of 
shares outstanding)
DEBT  = Total liabilities
TA  = Total assets
"	

#	
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Institutional stock ownership is the shares 
owned by other companies, pension funds, 
mutual funds, or other institutions (Monica 
and Hamfri, 2018), with the formula:
  Number of shares 
  owned by institutional investor
IO =
  Total company shares outstanding
"
		
,"4
Independent commissioner is the members of 

management, other members of the board of 
commissioners, controlling shareholders. They 
are free from business relationships or other 
relationships that can affect their ability to act 
independently (Muhammad Ridho, Kamaliah, 
!]+3^$%!_
Number of
independent commissioners 
IC =
Total members of 
the board of commissioners
$
#	
,$#4
Managerial ownership is the number of shares 
owned by the company management that 
actively participates in decision making in a 
company (Effendi, 2016: 59). 
The formula is:
 Number of shares 
owned by management
MO =
Total company shares outstanding
"
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An independent audit committee is a 
committee formed by and responsible to 
the board of commissioners in helping carry 
out the duties and functions of the board of 
commissioners (Yusuf et al, 2017). The size of 
the independent audit committee is calculated 
using the following formula:
5
6
57
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Number of members of 
independent audit committee
IAC =
Total members of audit committee
&
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
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Based on SOE Minister Regulation PER 
No 10 MBU 2012, the remuneration and 
nomination committee is an organ of the 
board of commissioners that is independent 
##`
remuneration and nomination, chaired by 
one of the board of commissioners. This 
remuneration and nomination committee 
is measured using a dummy variable e.g., 
the value is 1 if there is a remuneration and 
nomination committee, and 0 if there is no 
remuneration and nomination committee.
'()
	,')4
The board of directors is a group of directors 
led by the president director. The board of 
directors must also provide information to the 
board of commissioners and answer the things 
submitted by the board of commissioners 
(Effendi, 2016: 26-27). 
The formula is:
')89'()
	
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The Board of Commissioners is a mechanism to 
monitor and to provide guidance and direction 
to the company management (Bambang and 
Deri, 2013). 
The formula is:
'#89'(
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The researcher used multiple linear regression 
to test the effect of institutional ownership, 
independent commissioners, managerial 
ownership, independent audit committees, 
remuneration and nomination committees, 
board of directors, and board of commissioners 
on the company value of LQ 45 companies for 
the period 2015-2017.
The regression equation is as follows:
{|}~}33~}++~}~}~}~
}~}^~
Note:
Y  = Firm Value (Tobin’s Q)
}|>
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4.  DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
The results of the descriptive analysis on 
Table 2 show that the minimum value of 
company value ((Tobins Q) is 0.59, owned 
by PT. Pakuwon Jati Tbk in 2015. The result 
shows a ratio is below 1, meaning that the 
company is undervalued. The maximum value 
of company (Tobins Q) is 2.38, owned by PT. 
AKR Corporindo Tbk in 2015. The result shows 
the ratio is above 1, meaning that the company 
is overvalued, or rated twice as high as the 
value of the listed companies. The standard 
deviation of the company value (Tobins Q) is 
0.43040 or 43.040, which is smaller than the 
average value of 1.3650 or 136.500 so that the 
data are homogeneous. This indicates that the 
one data to another is not much different.
The results of the descriptive analysis 
on Table 2 show that the minimum value of 
institutional ownership (IO) is 0.00 or 0%, owned 
by Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) Tbk. 
This is because not all companies in Indonesia 
have institutional shares in it, or have a small 
percentage of institutional ownership. This 
value is also affected because the company’s 
shares are widely owned by subsidiaries. The 
maximum value of institutional ownership (IO) 
is 0.95 or 95%, owned by PT. Lippo Karawaci 
Tbk in 2016, this is because institution has 
more than half of total outstanding shares or 
majority investor in the period so as to increase 
the value of the company. The standard 
deviation of institutional ownership is 0.27606 
or 27.606 which is smaller than the average 
value of 0.4020 or 40.200 so that the data are 
homogeneous. It shows that the one data to 
another is not much differect.
The results of the descriptive analysis 
on Table 2 show that the minimum value of 
independent commissioner (IC) is 0.25 or 25% 
owned by PT Summarecon Agung Tbk in 2016. 
This is due to a reduction in the proportion 
of the independent commissioners. The 
maximum value of the independent variable of 
independent commissioner (IC) is 0.83 or 83% 
owned by PT. Lippo Karawaci Tbk in 2016. It 
is caused by the number of supervision and 
management of managers who come from 
outside the company. PT. Lippo Karawaci 
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Tbk hopes that the results obtained would be 
more objective because those who monitor 
managers come from both outside and within 
the company. The standard deviation of the 
independent commissioners is 0.11991 or 11.99 
smaller than the average value of 0.4092 or 
40,920, so the data are homogeneous. It can 
be said that one data to another is not much 
different.
The results of descriptive analysis in 
Table 2 show that the minimum value of 
the independent variable of managerial 
ownership (MO) is 0.00 or 0% owned by 
several companies in LQ 45. This is because 
the managerial or related parties such as 
directors / commissioners do not have shares 
in the company. The maximum value is 0.71 
 ^3   =!%  =  +3^
this is caused by the large number of shares 
owned by managerial party such as directors 
/ commissioners with a high percentage of 
#      
between shareholders and managers. The 
standard deviation of managerial ownership 
is 0.08316 or 8,316 which is greater than the 
average value of 0.0163 or 1,630 so that the data 
are heterogeneous. It can be said that one data 
to another is too much different.
The results of descriptive analysis on 
Table 2 show that the minimum value for the 
independent variable of independent audit 
committee (IAC) is 0.14 or 14% owned by 
several companies in LQ 45. This is due to the 
small number of independent commissioners 
available in the audit committee structure. 
The maximum value is 0.677 or 67.7% owned 
by Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk, Bank 
Tabungan Negara (Persero) Tbk, Global 
Mediacom Tbk. It is due to the large number of 
independent commissioners who also serve as 
audit committee members thereby increasing 
the number of audit committees that will have 
an effect on the independence of the audit 
committee within the company. The standard 
deviation of the independent audit committee 
is 0.09878 or 9,878 which is smaller than the 
average value of 0.331 or 33,100. Therefore, the 
data are homogeneous or one data to another is 
not much different.
The results of the descriptive analysis on 
Table 2 show that the independent variable 
of remuneration and nomination committee 
is calculated with a dummy variable which 
means that score 0 is given if the company 
does not have a remuneration and nomination 
committee, and score 1 is given if the company 
has a remuneration and nomination committee. 
Some companies do not have remuneration and 
nomination committee and the remuneration 
and nomination activities are monitored 
directly by the board of commissioners without 
forming a remuneration and nomination 
committee. Meanwhile, several other 
companies have remuneration and nomination 
committee. This is in accordance with good 
corporate governance standards.
Based on information on Table 3, it can 
be seen that 20 (18.9%) companies in LQ 45 
do not have a remuneration and nomination 
committee, while 86 (81.1%) companies in 
LQ 45 have a remuneration and nomination 
committee.
The results of the descriptive analysis in 
Table 2 show that the minimum value of the 
+6
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N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Tobin’s Q 106 0.59 2.38 1.3650 0.43040
Institutional Ownership 106 0.00 0.95 0.4020 0.27606
Independent Commissioners 106 0.25 0.83 0.4092 0.11991
Managerial Ownership 106 0.00 0.71 0.0163 0.08316
Remuneration and Nomination Com-
mittee
106 Exist Not Exist Exist Not Exist
	 	3 86 20
Independent Audit Committee 106 0.14 0.677 0.331 0.09878
Board of Directors 106 3.00 11.00 6.7642 1.93490
Board of Commissioners 106 3.00 12.00 5.9151 2.02422
106
Source: Processed Data
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independent variable of board of directors 
(BoD) is 0.3 (3 members of the board of 
directors) owned by several companies in LQ 
45. This is because some companies believe 
that if they have a few members of board 
of directors, the supervision will be more 
effective and the company has at least applied 
the Financial Services Authority Regulation 
Number 33/ Pojk.04/ 2014 regarding the Board 
of Directors and the Board of Commissioners. 
Each company must have at least 2 members 
of the board of directors. The maximum value 
is 0.11 (11 members of the board of directors) 
owned by PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk, Astra International Tbk, and PT Bank 
Central Asia Tbk. This is because the board 
of directors within the company has great 
control in carrying out operational activities 
that can increase the value of the company. The 
standard deviation of the board of directors 
is 1.93490 or 19,349 which is smaller than the 
average value of 6, 7642 or 67,642 so that the 
data is homogeneous or one data to another is 
not much different.
The results of the descriptive analysis 
in Table 2 show that the minimum value 
of the independent variable of board of 
commissioners (BoC) is 0.3 (3 members of the 
board of commissioners) owned by several 
companies in LQ 45. The maximum value is 0.11 
(12 members of the board of commissioners) 
owned by PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk, Astra International Tbk, and PT Bank 
Central Asia Tbk. This is because the high 
percentage of the board of commissioners will 
minimize the occurrence of physical pressure 
problems faced. The board of directors will 
use the board of commissioners for their 
interests. The standard deviation of the board 
of commissioners is 2.02422 or 20,243 which 
is smaller than the average value of 5.9151 or 
59.151 so that the data is homogeneous or it 
one data to another is not much different.
The results of multiple linear regression 
analysis show that sig. values of the 
independent variables of institutional owner-
ship, independent commissioner, board of 
directors, and board of commissioners are 
 %%     # 
can be affected. Conversely, the company 
value cannot be affected by the managerial 
ownership, independent audit committees, 
and remuneration and nomination committee 
because their Sig. Values are > 0.05.
Based on such assumption and results, 
This study can conclude that the regression 
model equation is as follows:
!` | 3%^ ~ %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~ %+;3"'Z$  %+"&>$ ~ %"
>$ ~
%"	$%3">$~
((("	

#	
,"#4

The results of multiple linear regression 
analysis indicate that institutional ownership 
affects company value. Based on these results it 
shows that institutional ownership can increase 
company value, measured by the existence 
of supervision or monitoring activities on 
management that can prevent wasteful costs. 
The higher the institutional ownership, 
the higher the intensity of institution to act 
professionally to monitor the investment in 
 #      
accordance with their wish. In reference to 
agency theory, institutional ownership, as the 
principal, will oversee management, as the 
agent, to perform some services to increase the 
value of the company.
+;
&	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Model
>
Sig.
B Std. Error
(Constant) 1.740 0.219 0.000
Institutional Ownership 0.463 0.139 0.001
Independent Commissioners -1.308 0.355 0.000
Managerial Ownership 0.281 0.363 0.442
Independent Audit Committee -0.552 0.402 0.172
Remuneration and Nomination Committee 0.065 0.104 0.534
Board of Directors 0.059 0.022 0.008
Board of Commissioners -0.051 0.021 0.015
Source: Processed Data
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The results of this study are in line with 
those of the research conducted by Christian 
and Made (2015) that institutional ownership 
affects company value. The credibility 
and accuracy of the information owned by 
institutional investors can be considered for 
making the right decision by the company 
management. Therefore, the greater the 
concentration of institutional ownership, the 
higher the company’s performance. The result 
of this study contradicts that by Mateus (2017) 
that institutional ownership has no effect on 
company value.
((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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The results of multiple linear regression 
analysis show that independent commissioner 
has an effect on company value. It indicates 
that independent commissioner can reduce 
the company value because the sometimes 
do not act independently. This can reduce 
the company performance. The result of this 
'+3;
#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company value. An independent commissioner 
     
internal managers, such as in the misuse 
of assets. These result, however, is not 
consistent with that by Sandra, et al (2015) that 
independent commissioners have no effect on 
the company value because the independent 
     
the regulations and the basic process is not in 
accordance with the competencies needed.
((($
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The results of multiple linear regression 
analysis show that managerial ownership 
     % !  
management cannot control the company’s 
management properly and the management 
cannot either act fraudulently by manipulating 
reporting that can reduce the company value. 
Low managerial ownership in the company 
can also be a factor of being unable to work in 
accordance with the wishes of the principal. The 

by the company. Agency theory explains that 
if an agent or manager cannot perform services 
in accordance with the wishes of the principal, 

%!
affect the company value to decline.
The result of this study is consistent 
with that by Mateus (2017) that managerial 
#%!
because the share ownership by the manager 
is very small or non-existent, so the sense of 
ownership of the company and the motivation 
of management in increasing the value of the 
company are considered to be low. This resulst 
is not consistent with that by Ridho, et al (2017) 
that managerial ownership has an effect on the 
company value.
((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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The result of the multiple regression analysis 
shows that the independent audit committee 
has no effect on the company value. It is 
because the existence of audit committee in the 
company is a must, as one of the requirements 
that must be met by the company. There are 
some concerns about the existence of an 
independent audit committee which is judged 
solely to comply with regulations or obligations 
required by the Financial Services Authority 
(OJK). Therefore, the investment decision 
making by investors cannot be measured by 
the existence of independent audit committee 
in the company. As such, the independent 
audit committee cannot increase the company 
value. 
Agency theory also explains that an 
independent audit committee, as an agent, 
must perform services for investors or 
principals, and the services are a necessity or 
obligation. The presence of an independent 
audit committee is not a reason for an increase 
  % !     
consistent with that by Putu (2018) that an 
independent audit committee has no effect on 
company value.
(((&
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The result of the multiple linear regression 
analysis shows that the remuneration and 
nomination committee has no effect on company 
value. This is because the appointment of the 
remuneration and nomination committee 
by the company was done solely to comply 
with regulations and was not intended to 
enforce Good Corporate Governance in the 
company. In addition, some companies did 
not have such a committee. This indicates 
that some companies still do not comply 
the regulations set by the Financial Services 
Authority (OJK). Some companies merge the 
duties of the remuneration committee with 
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the duties of the board of directors, so that the 
duties and responsibilities of this committee 
are directly held by the board of directors. 
The remuneration and nomination committee 
also triggers the company to spend more 
on the services of this committee which will 
have an impact on the decline in the value of 
the company. In accordance with the agency 
theory, if the agent does not perform services 
in accordance with the wishes of the principal, 
it will cause agency costs that can reduce the 
value of the company. Companies will spend 
more and more to pay the remuneration and 
nomination committee.
The results of this study are consistent 
with the results of the research conducted by 
Bambang and Deri (2013) that the remuneration 
and nomination committee has no effect 
on company value. From the results of the 
hypothesis test it can be seen that the existence 
of this committee will reduce the value of the 
company. This is because the existence of this 
committee will trigger a greater cost.
((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The results of multiple linear regression 
analysis show that the board of directors 
     #% !
more members of the board of directors, the 
more the division of tasks to create a good 
business strategy for the company. The board 
#
company, because if the company is good, the 
board of directors will be even good in the eyes 
of investors and potential investors. The more 
members of the board of directors, the more 
  #  # 
order to increase the value of the company. 
According to the agency theory, the board of 
directors, as an agent, will act in accordance 
with the wishes of the principal or investor 
because the presence of the board of directors 
##
an impact on the interests of the investors.
The result of this research is in line with 
the result of the research conducted by adhitya 
(2016) and Bambang and Deri (2013) that the 
      
the company. The research was conducted 
in several different sectors but the results 
obtained remained the same that the board of 
directors affected the value of the company. 
Therefore, the more the members of the board 
of directors, the easier it is to create strategies 
to increase the value of the company.
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The results of multiple linear regression 
analysis show that the board of commissioners 
 %!
of the board of commissioners, the more 
       
the board of commissioners for personal gain. 
An effective board of commissioners can 
improve management performance standards 
in a company so that it can have an impact on 
increasing company value. In accordance with 
the agency theory, the board of commissioners, 
as an agent, must be able to minimize agency 
      
directors and shareholders, because the role 
of the board of commissioners in the company 
is to monitor the implementation of directors’ 
policies.
The result of this research is in line 
with the result of the research conducted by 
Brayen (2015) that the board of commissioners 
#%!
members of the board of commissioners, the 
more optimal the supervision by the board 
of commissioners on the performance of the 
board of directors.
<=#%>*"#%?"$@""#%?*>B
STION, AND LIMITATIONS
Based on the results of hypotheses testing, the 
   _ "3$  
hypothesis (H1) is accepted, which means that 
#
on the company value of LQ 45 companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2015-
2017; the second hypothesis (H2) is accepted, 
which means that independent commissioner 
   #
of LQ 45 companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange period 2015-2017; (3) the third 
hypothesis (H3) is rejected, which means that 
#
on the company value of LQ 45 companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2015-
2017; (4) the fourth hypothesis (H4) is rejected, 
which means that independent audit committee 
#
of LQ 45 companies listed on the Indonesia 
]X#+3[+3^ "$ 
hypothesis (H5) is rejected, which means that 
remuneration and nomination committee 
 #
of LQ 45 companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange period 2015 -2017; (6) the sixth 
hypothesis (H6) is accepted. It means that the 
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company value of LQ 45 companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2015-2017; 
(7) the seventh hypothesis (H7) is accepted. It 
means that independent audit committee has 
     #  
LQ 45 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange period 2015-2017.
The researcher realizes that this study 
needs further additional research for making 
it more generalizable.  This study excluded 
several samples because some of the data 
were not normally distributed. Therefore, the 
outliers had to be done 8 times in order that the 
data could be normally distributed. This study 
has several factors that cause heteroscedasticity 
problems, in which one of the variables has a 
sig. value of <0.05. In addition, this study also 
has an autocorrelation problem. The results 
of the Durbin Watson analysis still cannot be 
concluded.
It is recommended that further research 
add more research samples in order to obtain 
much more generalizable result. In addition, 
it is also recommended that further research 
add other variables such as Risk Management 
Committee, Human Resources Committee, 
CSR and others which can also affect the 
company value.
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